Means to build fault-tolerant services have been at hand for some time. Defense against attacks remains a difficult problem, though. And this problem becomes ever more urgent with the increasing use of networked computing systems in our society's critical infrastructures and in future-generation military systems (such as GIG and JBI). The objective of this AFOSR-funded effort is to bridge the gap from fault-tolerance to attack-tolerance by exploring two threads.
Objectives
Means to build fault-tolerant services have been at hand for some time. Defense against attacks remains a difficult problem, though. And this problem becomes ever more urgent with the increasing use of networked computing systems in our society's critical infrastructures and in future-generation military systems (such as GIG and JBI). The objective of this AFOSR-funded effort is to bridge the gap from fault-tolerance to attack-tolerance by exploring two threads.
• The use of mechanically-generated diversity for creating independent server replicas and a "moving target" defense.
• Language-based techniques to build a new theoretical basis for authorization and for quantifying information flow and information corruption.
Summary of Completed Research

Moving target defenses: Theory and practice
Semantic Framework for Diversity. A set of replicas is diverse to the extent that all implement the same functionality but differ in their imple- 
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Cornell University,Ithaca,NY,14853 8 . PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER mentation details. Diverse replicas are less prone to having vulnerabilities in common, because attacks typically depend on memory layout and/or instruction-sequence specifics. Recent work advocates using mechanical means, such as program rewriting, to create such diversity. A correspondence between the specific transformations being employed and the attacks they defend against is often provided. But little has been said about the overall effectiveness of diversity per se in defending against attacks. With this broader goal in mind, we developed a precise characterization of attacks, applicable to viewing diversity as a defense. In addition, we showed how mechanically-generated diversity compares to a well-understood defense: strong typing.
The reduction we derived-defenses created by mechanically-generated diversity are forms of probabilistic dynamic type-checking-was surprising. Unfortunately, this result ignores probabilities, which do matter for practical application. The work is thus best seen as only a first step in characterizing the effectiveness of program obfuscation and other forms of mechanicallygenerated diversity.
Proactive Obfuscation Prototype. Proactive obfuscation is a movingtarget defense. It involves running diverse replicas and periodically selecting a replica for replacement by a new one, where that new one differs internally from any prior replica used in the system. Proactive obfuscation creates independence and also preserves it over time, even when attackers can analyze individual replicas.
A firewall controls the passage of packets from some outer network to an enclave it is protecting. Because it resides at the border to a potentially hostile network, attack-tolerance is crucial for a firewall. And because it is the sole means by which packets enter or exit an enclave, availability is also important. A firewall was thus an ideal service to implement using an approach, like proactive obfuscation, intended for building trustworthy services.
We built that prototype and conducted a rather extensive analysis of its performance. This analysis involved deploying different implementations of the various underlying mechanisms, so that we could identify bottlenecks. We also implemented a distributed storage service that uses Byzantine Quorum Systems (rather than state machine replication) and employs proactive obfuscation to create the artificial diversity needed for independence among those servers.
Convincing Alternative to Digital Signatures. Systems that employ proactive obfuscation and, indeed, most protocols for fault-tolerance and attack-tolerance, often rely on public-key signatures for message-source authentication, defense against corruption of in-transit messages, and also as a proof to recipients of correct protocol execution. In our proactive obfuscation prototypes, as in many distributed services, the overhead of generating and checking signatures must be kept low. With public-key signatures it won't be, which prompted us to develop lower-cost alternatives for this setting.
A k-convincing tag can be forwarded at least k−1 times and still be guaranteed to convince receivers of its authenticity. We developed an O(k nlog n) probabilistic protocol for the case when n hosts might receive such a tag; in some contexts, our protocol is faster than using public-key signatures. We also developed an O(n 2 log 2 n) probabilistic protocol for computing kconvincing tags for all k simultaneously. And we ran experiments to compare the performance of these protocols to fast implementations of public-key signatures and to closely related MAC constructions.
Language-based techniques
Hyperproperties. Important classes of security policies cannot be expressed using what have been termed properties, sets of execution traces for which membership of a trace depends on the trace alone and not on which other traces are in the property. For example, noninterference is a confidentiality policy that stipulates commands executed on behalf of users holding high clearances have no effect on system behavior observed by users with only low clearances. Noninterference is not a property, because whether some given trace is allowed depends on whether another trace (obtained by deleting command executions by high users) is allowed. As a second example, stipulating a bound on average response time over all executions is an availability policy that cannot be specified as a property, because the acceptability of delays in any given execution depends on the magnitude of delays in all other executions.
These expressiveness limitations are overcome by using a new abstraction we developed-hyperproperties, sets of properties (i.e., sets of sets of traces). There are two interesting classes of hyperproperties: safety and liveness. And we have been able prove the following.
• Hyperproperties can describe properties and, moreover, can describe security policies, such as noninterference and average response time, that properties cannot. Indeed, we have not been able to find requirements on system behavior that cannot be specified as a hyperproperty. Deterministic, nondeterministic, and probabilistic system models all can be handled using hyperproperties.
• Every hyperproperty is the intersection of a safety hyperproperty and a liveness hyperproperty. Safety hyperproperties and liveness hyperproperties thus form a fundamental basis from which all hyperproperties can be constructed.
• The topological characterization of properties can be generalized to characterize hyperproperties, and the result is equivalent to the lower Vietoris topology.
We have not been able to obtain complete verification methods for safety hyperproperties or for liveness hyperproperties, but we have been able to generalize prior work on using invariance arguments to verify informationflow policies. Our generalization is applicable to a class of hyperproperties we introduce called k-safety.
We have also been able to relate the hyperproperties framework to stepwise refinement. Whereas safety properties are preserved by such refinement steps, hypersafety properties are not. We also explored the extent to which the hyperproperties framework applies to arbitrary system representations, such as relations, labeled transition systems, and probabilistic state machines.
Quantification of Integrity. Hyperproperties are qualitative. In fact, the usual characterization of security in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability is qualitative. Engineering realities often require quantitative characterizations. Methods have long existed for specifying and verifying quantitative bounds on the flow of confidential information. Yet methods for quantification of corruption-that is, damage to integrity-have received little attention to date.
Under the auspices of this funding, we developed a framework and a method to calculate bounds on integrity corruption. To quantify corruption, a formal definition of "integrity" was required. We took two distinct notions of information modification as points of departure: taint analysis and program correctness. These, in turn, led to two distinct measures of corruption that we named contamination and suppression.
Contamination is defined to be the flow of information from untrusted inputs to outputs that are supposed to be trusted. Trusted outputs are not supposed to be influenced by untrusted information, so contamination corrupts integrity. Flow between untrusted and trusted objects was first studied by Biba, who identified a duality between models of integrity and confidentiality. The confidentiality dual to contamination is leakage, which is information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. The Biba duality thus suggests that any method for measuring leakage of information could serve as the basis for measuring contamination.
Our other measure for corruption, suppression, is derived from program correctness. For a given input, a correct implementation should produce an output o permitted by a specification. Any knowledgeable user of these implementations could recover o from the implementation's output. With programs and channels, suppression occurs when information is lost. Information theory can be used to quantify suppression, including how to bound the attacker's influence on suppression.
We might suspect that contamination generalizes suppression, or vice versa, but we have proved this is not the case. Moreover, we have been able to use our approach to derive quantitative measures for various anonymization algorithms that have been proposed to support database privacy: kanonymity, l-diversity, and differential privacy. This work is based on a new theorem we derived; it asserts that suppression plus leakage is necessarily a constant (related to the information content of the object being anonymized).
Credentials-based Authorization. Authorization is fundamental to implementing any trustworthy system. To be trustworthy, a system must behave as expected but not exhibit any other behaviors. And authorization, which governs what requests a system will accept, is the way requests for unacceptable system behaviors are blocked.
Nexus Authorization Logic (NAL) was developed to provide a principled basis for specifying and reasoning about credentials and authorization policies. It extended prior access control logics based on "says" and "speaksfor" operators, enabling within a single framework request authorization to depend on (i) the source or pedigree of the requester, (ii) the outcome of performing an analysis on the requester, or (iii) the use of trusted software to encapsulate or modify the requester. Prototype document-viewer applications that enforce integrity and confidentiality of document contents-all implemented on the Nexus operating system-have been built to illustrate the convenience and expressive power of this approach to authorization.
Impacts on the Community
It can be difficult to trace the impact that ideas have, and the research reported herein is mostly concerned with new ideas. However, there are two direct consequences that can likely be traced to our research. They concern framing of the problem space (and ultimately new federal funding).
• The CNCI "moving target defense" focus area apparently had its origins with the proactive obfuscation work discussed above.
• A MURI and a new CNCI initiative on science of security, including a DDRE-funded Jasons study (JSR-10-102) in Summer 2010, all are direct responses to the PI's advocacy (in Congressional testimony and in discussions with DoD). The language-based technique discussed above has provided examples of the pay-off these investments could provide.
There are other less-direct transitions that arise through the PI's involvement in various advisory capacities.
• Schneider is Chief Scientist of the NSF TRUST Science and Technology Center, which includes U.C. Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon University, Cornell University, Stanford University, and Vanderbilt University.
• Schneider is a member of the following industrial advisory boards: Fortify Software Technical Advisory Board; Microsoft's Trustworthy Computing Academic Advisory Board (co-chair).
• Schneider served on the following other advisory committees: NIST Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board; Computing Research Association Board of Directors; Defense Science Board; Computing Community Consortium Council.
Publications Supported
